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1 Introduction
In many countries, spatial disparities between local markets are large and raise some major policy
concerns. Whereas the focus of the attention is often the labour market (Combes and Overman,
2004), disparities also occur on other markets such as housing or health. This paper develops a
new approach to explaining the spatial disparities in healthcare quality.
In the health literature, some studies quantify the international variations in healthcare reim-
bursment and utilization (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000) and the interregional variations in
health care delivery (Sutton and Lock, 2000). Other papers are interested in the determinants
of quality within a given country and exploit the spatial dimension to construct some control
variables or instruments. Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) study the effect of hospital
on mortality and instrument the hospital choice with the distance between the place of residence
and hospitals. A growing strand of the literature is interested in the effect of the local healthcare
market structure on health outcome. Most authors try to estimate the marginal effect of local
competition on health quality (see Gaynor, 2006 for a survey). However, they do not assess how
spatial variations in competition can explain spatial disparities in quality.
In fact, evaluating the marginal effect of some factors on mortality and assessing how some spatial
variations in these factors can explain spatial disparities in mortality are two related but different
exercices. For instance, it is usually found that sex significantly affects mortality. If there was
no variation in the share of females across the territory though, the differences in the local sex
composition would not explain the disparities in mortality across locations. The same arguments
apply when considering local determinants such as local competition indices. It may happen that
local competition has a significant marginal effect on mortality but only small spatial variations.
In that case, it does not explain the spatial disparities in mortality on the territory.
In this paper, we conduct a variance analysis of regional disparities in mortality by acute my-
ocardial infarction (AMI) in France. We quantify these disparities and assess the importance of
the factors which may explain them. We can distinguish three types of factors according to the
literature on health. First, the spatial disparities in mortality can be explained by some differences
in the local composition of patients (case-mix) if there is some spatial sorting according to indi-
vidual attributes related to the propensity to die (such as age or sex). Second, they can be caused
by hospital attributes such as ownership status which is usually found to affect hospital perfor-
mances. McClellan and Staiger (2000) show that within specific markets in the US, the quality of
care to the elderly would be better in for-profit hospitals than in not-for-profit hospitals. Milcent
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(2005) finds that in France, patients in for-profit hospitals have a lower probability of death when
having a heart-attack than patients in public hospitals.1 Hospitals also exhibit some variations in
equipment, innovative treatments, physician skills and activities that can be related to differences
in health outcome (Tay, 2003). Third, spatial disparities in mortality can come from differences
between local healthcare markets. In particular, the local competition measured with a Herfindahl
index is often found to have a significant negative impact on mortality (Kessler and McClellan,
2000).
We estimate a model at the individual level where the propensity of patients to die during their stay
in hospital is specified as a function of the three types of explanatory factors. We then average the
model at the regional level and conduct a variance analysis in the spirit of the literature in economic
geography (Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2002; Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008; Mion and
Naticchioni, 2008). Estimations are conducted on a unique matched patient-hospital dataset from
some exhaustive French administrative records over the 1998-2003 period. This original dataset
contains some information on the demographic characteristics of patients, their diagnoses and
their treatments. It also provides some details on the hospitals where the patients are treated,
like the location, the ownership status and the capacity.
More specifically, we use a very flexible econometric specification building on Ridder and Tunali
(1999) and Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010). We first estimate a Cox duration model stratified
by hospital (i.e. each hospital has a specific baseline hazard) using the stratified partial likelihood
estimator (SPLE). The individual variables included in the model are the patient characteris-
tics (demographic shifters and secondary diagnoses) and treatments (as they are patient-specific).
Their effects are estimated while taking properly into account the hospital unobserved hetero-
geneity. Our approach also allows to recover some hospital hazard functions without specifying
them parametrically. We then go further and specify the hospital hazards as the product of some
hospital fixed effects and a baseline hazard. We show how to estimate the hospital fixed effects
using some moment conditions. The estimated hospital fixed effects are regressed on some hospital
and local variables. We finally average the model at the regional level and make a spatial variance
analysis.
We show that regional disparities in mortality are quite large. In particular, the raw difference in
1Other references include Hansman (1996), Newhouse (1970), Cutler and Horwitz (1998), Gowrisankaran and
Town (1999), Silverman and Skinner (2001), Sloan et al. (2001), Kessler and McClellan (2002), Shortell and Highes
(1998), Ho and Hamilton (2000).
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the propensity to die within 15 days between the extreme regions reaches 80%. After taking into
account the individual variables, this difference drops to 47%. A variance analysis at the regional
level shows that regional differences in innovative treatments play a major role in explaining the
regional disparities in mortality. A local Herfindahl index computed from the number of patients
in each hospital also plays a significant role. Results suggest that spatial differences in the local
concentration of patients partly explain spatial differences in mortality.
In a first section, we present the different factors which may explain the spatial differences in
healthcare quality in France and review the corresponding literature. A second section describes
our dataset. We then present in a third section some descriptive statistics on the regional dispar-
ities in mortality, demand factors and supply factors. The fourth section details the econometric
methodology used to identify the causes of the regional disparities in mortality. The fifth section
summarizes the results of the model.
2 Heart attack in the French context
2.1 The French context
The aim of the paper is to quantify the regional disparities in the mortality of patients hospitalized
in France for a heart attack and identify their key determinants. As mentioned earlier, three
potential explanations of these disparities are the spatial differences in the composition of patients
(case-mix), the composition of hospitals, and the local healthcare market structure (in particular
the intensity of competition between hospitals). Whereas the local composition of patients can be
viewed as the local demand for healthcare, the local composition of hospitals and competition are
related to the local supply.
On the demand side, spatial differences in demographic shifters and secondary diagnoses possibly
related to specific regional behaviours may explain regional disparities in mortality.
2.1.1 Hospitals’ characteristics
On the supply side, the local composition of hospitals can affect the local propensity of AMI
patients to die if hospitals differ in their efficiency to treat patients and are distributed over space
according to their efficiency. We now briefly describe the French system to highlight how hospitals
can differ in their efficiency.
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The public sector is under a global budget system as well as part of the private sector. Private
hospitals which benefit from this budget are Not-For-Profit hospitals (NFP). Every year, the
government determines the global budget and chooses how to divide it between regions. The
regional budget is shared between NFP and public hospitals according to the budget of the previous
year and through bilateral bargaining between the regional regulator and the hospital managers.
NFP and public hospitals have to grant access to hospital care to every patient and cannot make
any profit. Also, public and NFP hospitals provide similar high-tech care. By contrast, the
other hospitals in the private sector (namely For-Profit hospitals) are paid by fee-for-services and
can select patients. The selection is usually done to maximize profit, taking into account the
health status of patients. FP hospitals have no constraint on profits. Overall, hospitals thus have
different incentives to provide health care to patients depending on their status (public or private)
and reimbursement rule (fee-for-service or global budget).
Importantly, there is no segmentation of the healthcare market by insurance status interfering
with the effect of the hospital status as in the US. Indeed, people with a health insurance in the US
have some form of managed care insurance. Plan enrollees have to choose from a pre-approved
subset of doctors and hospitals in their area. Hospitals in the subset can have a specific status. As
a consequence, the effect of the hospital status is intertwined with the effect of the insurance status.
In France, hospital expenditures are fully reimbursed by a unique public compulsory insurer which
funds come from taxes. Patients can freely choose their hospital and there is no segmentation by
insurance status. Hence, the true effect of the hospital status can be identified more easily as in
the case of Taiwan (Lien, Chou and Liu, 2008).
Milcent (2005) finds for France that ownership significantly affects the mortality rate. Her
results suggest that patients in FP hospitals have a lower probability of death but face a greater
uncertainty on the quality of care. FP, NFP and public hospitals are distributed unevenly on
the French territory, in particular for demographic and historical reasons. Hence, there are some
regional disparities in the local composition of hospitals which can yield some regional disparities
in mortality of AMI patients treated in hospitals.
Because of the reimbursement rules, hospitals do not have the same incentives to treat patients
with innovative procedures. Indeed, FP hospitals are financed via a fee-for-service system. Innova-
tive supplies involving expensive devices that can be used only once such as angioplasty or stent2
for heart attack are reimbursed ex-post in addition to the fee-for-service payment. By contrast,
2See below for a definition of the angioplasty and stent.
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the reimbursement of public and NFP hospitals does not depend on the number of procedures
which are performed. Therefore, FP hospitals have more incentives to perform innovative proce-
dures than public and NFP hospitals. Milcent (2005) finds for France that innovative treatments
decrease the mortality of AMI patients. Spatial differences in the use of innovative treatments
(which are related to the spatial sorting of FP hospitals) can cause regional differences in mortality
of AMI patients.
The efficiency of hospitals may also be affected by the intensity of hospital activities because
of some learning by doing. As a consequence, we will investigate the role played by the spatial
disparities in the occupancy rate and the proportion of patients treated for an AMI, in explaining
the spatial disparities in mortality. Finally, larger hospitals can bear larger fixed costs related
to equipment as these costs can be shared between more patients. Consequently, we will also
evaluate whether spatial disparities in the hospital size proxied by the number of beds (in total
and in surgery) are related to spatial differences in mortality.
2.1.2 Competition between hospitals
There is a growing body of US literature on the effect of local competition between hospitals on
their efficiency (see Gaynor, 2006, for a survey). Whereas some papers investigate situations where
prices are set by hospitals, most studies focus on cases where prices are fixed and hospitals can
only choose quality of care. In France, prices are regulated in both the public and private sectors.
Hence, the competition between hospitals would only be based on quality. Moreover, public and
NFP hospitals which are paid under the global budget system are not allowed to make any profit.
As a consequence, these hospitals do not have incentives to compete with each other even by
providing a better quality of care contrary to their US counterparts. By contrast, FP hospitals
can make some profit and thus have some incentives to attract patients. This can be done by
providing some services of better quality than in other FP hospitals, as well as in public and NFP
hospitals. The higher the number of private hospitals, the more important is competition based
on quality. On the other hand, the quality of care in a hospital depends on learning-by-doing
which is directly related to the number of patients treated in that hospital. When the patients in
an area are scattered across many small hospitals rather than a few large ones, there is not much
learning-by-doing in each hospital and the average quality of care in the area could then be lower.
When a patient chooses a hospital where to be treated, he takes into account the accomodation
and catering which differ in private and public hospitals. More importantly, he is attracted by
6
the physicians who are the most efficient and can provide the best care. As FP hospitals want to
attract patients to make profit, they will try to get the most efficient physicians. This is a specific
form of competition based on quality. In fact, the best physicians have some incentives to work
in FP hospitals because of the specific payment rule which differs from the one applied to public
and NFP hospitals.
In the public sector, the staff (including physicians and nurses) consists of salaried civil servants.
Their wages do not depend on their performance. One day a week, though, they can work outside
their hospital, in particular in a FP hospital. Physicians working in NFP hospitals are also salaried
but their wages are far higher than in public hospitals. In FP hospitals, some physicians are salaried
and the others are self-employed. The working time of physicians as well as their wages usually
depend on the number of patients. Moreover, physicians receive additional fees when performing
innovative procedures. Overall, their income is far larger than in public hospitals. Consequently,
physicians usually compete to get a job in the private sector and only the best of them are
selected.3 Interestingly, this competition has an effect on medical practices in public hospitals. As
physicians want to get employed by private hospitals, they perform some innovative procedures
to increase their reputation and skills with learning by doing. Dormont and Milcent (2006) show
that hospitals under global budget perform innovative procedures at a rate close to the one of the
FP hospitals.
Hospitals which ischemic service has grown large are usually those succeeding in attracting
patients because of a better reputation. The best physicians have gathered there, can still improve
with learning-by-doing, and perform better than in other hospitals which have become smaller.
The concentration of patients in a few large hospitals rather than many small ones in an area
could then be associated with a better average local quality.
In the US, the local competition among hospitals affects the patients’ propensity to die
(Gaynor, 2006). Was it the case in France, spatial disparities in the local competition among
hospitals could partly explain the regional differences in mortality. In our study, we account for
the intensity of competition between hospitals through a Herfindahl index which measures the
concentration of patients in a few large hospitals rather than many small ones and is expected
to have a positive effect on mortality (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Town and Vistnes, 2001;
Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003). Note however that for France, the local concentration of pa-
3There is a large literature on the incentives for physicians depending on the payment’s rule (Hart and Holm-
strom, 1987; Pauly, 1990; Blomqvist, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Newhouse, 1996; McGuire, 2000).
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tients could also reflect some learning-by-doing or the gathering of efficient physicians in the same
place. In that case, the effect of the Herfindahl index would rather be negative. Overall, the sign
of its effect is theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical issue.
Our empirical approach will allow us to assess the respective importance of the determinants
in explaining the regional disparities in the mortality of AMI patients.
2.2 Treatments of heart attack
In this paper, we focus on one single disease. Indeed, evidence shows that the effect of characteris-
tics on mortality is disease-specific (Wray et al., 1997). We select the Acute Myocardial Infarction
(heart attack) for four reasons. First, it belongs to the ischemic-disease group that has been the
primary cause of mortality in France, before getting second recently after cancer. Second, mortal-
ity from AMI has been widely studied in the literature to assess the quality of hospital care in the
US and the UK. This literature can be used for comparison (see Goworisakaran and Town, 2003,
for the US, and Propper, Burgess and Green, 2004, for the UK). Third, AMI is a well-defined
pathology with only a few re-admissions due to its clinical definition. Fourth, mortality from AMI
is an event frequent enough to yield some reliable statistical results.
Heart attacks occur when arteries or veins which irrigate the heart are clogged. In hospitals,
patients can benefit from various treatments and procedures to improve the blood flow in clogged
arteries. These include bypass surgery, cardiac catheters (denoted as CATH hereafter), percuta-
neous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and stent. A catheter is a thin flexible pipe
which is installed in a vein. It may also be used for cleaning arteries in order to improve the blood
flow. A bypass surgery reroute, or “bypass”, is a vein or artery collected from the patient’s body
and set up to derive blood from coronary arteries. In some cases, the stent and the angioplasty are
some alternative procedures to the bypass which yield a better quality of life after home return.
An angioplasty consists in inflating a balloon in a blockage to create a channel. This procedure
is costly as it induces for one stay an increase in costs which ranges from 30% to 60% (Dormont
and Milcent, 2002). The stent is a spring-shaped prosthesis which is used as a complement to
angioplasty. The use of stent with an angioplasty significantly improves the results. Angioplasties
and stents are some innovative treatments over the 1998-2003 period. We will study how the
spatial variations in treatments can explain regional differences in mortality.
In this article, the term stent refers to an angioplasty together with one or more stents, the
term angioplasty refers to an angioplasty without stent, and the term catheterism refers to a
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catheterism without angioplasty and stent.
2.3 Spatial features
We now propose a spatial overview of heart attack. First note that AMI patients who want to
be treated in a NFP or a public hospital have to go to a hospital within their region of residence.
However, some patients are sometimes transferred to a neighbouring hospital in another region.
Also, a patient who gets sick in another region may be cured there. Over the 1998-2003 period, the
proportion of AMI patients being treated within their region of residence is very high at 92.9%.
This proportion is slightly lower for FP hospitals (91.4%) than for public hospitals (93.1%) and
NFP (95.8%). These statistics support the fact that regions can be viewed as local healthcare
markets for heart attack.
Depending on their residential location, patients do not face the same supply of healthcare, as
the local composition of hospitals by status and mode of reimbursment varies widely across space.
In 1999, the proportion of beds in public hospitals is large in the west and in Franche Comte´ (in
the east) where it reaches 80%, whereas it is only 46% in the PACA region (the southern French
Riviera). The proportion of NFP hospitals is the highest in some eastern regions at the German
border (Alsace and Lorraine) for historical reasons. Conversely, the proportion of beds in FP
hospitals is larger in the south-east (around the French Riviera region) where the population is
older and richer.
The local proportions of patients treated for an AMI in the different types of hospitals mimic the
distribution of bed capacities. For instance, Graph 1 shows that around Paris and in southern
regions, the proportion of patients treated in a FP hospital is higher. These regions are often
characterized by a substantial use of innovative procedures like stents, as shown in Graph 2. In
fact, the rank correlation between the proportion of stents and the proportion of patients in FP
hospitals is .61. When considering NFP hospitals instead of FP hospitals, the correlation is still
quite high at .44.
[Insert Graphs 1 and 2]
We also computed the probability of death within 15 days (see Graph 3).4 This probability is quite
low in the Paris region, the east and south-east. It is larger in the west and south-west. There is no
obvious relationship between the probability of dying and the proportions of stents or FP hospitals
4See below for more details on how this probability is computed.
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(rank correlations: −.09 and .14 respectively). However, south eastern regions which have a large
proportion of FP hospitals performing innovative treatments also concentrate older people who are
more likely to die. Hence, it is necessary to perform an econometric analysis to disentangle the effect
of age and more generally of individual attributes (demographic characteristics and secondary
diagnosis) from that of innovative procedures, hospital characteristics, and local healthcare market
structure.
[Insert Graph 3]
3 The dataset
3.1 Data sources on patients, hospitals and areas
We use the PMSI dataset (Programme de Me´dicalisation des Syste`mes d’Information) which pro-
vides the records of all patients discharged from any French acute-care hospital over the 1998-2003
period. It is compulsory for hospitals to provide these records on a yearly basis.5 Three nice fea-
tures of this dataset are that it provides some information at the patient level, it keeps track of
hospitals across time, and it is exhaustive both for the public and private sectors.6 A limit of the
data is that patients cannot be followed across time if they come back later to the same hospital
or if they change hospital.
The dataset contains some information on the demographic characteristics of patients (age
and sex), as well as some very detailed information on the diagnoses and treatments. In our
analysis, we can thus take into account all secondary coronary diagnoses as well as all techniques
used to cure patients. One may argue that some comorbidity factors are not recorded. However,
McClellan and Staiger (1999) show that much more detailed medical data on disease severity and
comorbidity do not add much when taking into account the heterogeneity among patients. The
dataset also provides us with the type of entry (whether the patients come from their place of
residence, another care service in the same hospital or another hospital) as well as the type of exit
(death, home return, transfer to another hospital or transfer to another care service).
We only keep patients whose pathology was coded as an acute myocardial infarction in the
tenth international code of disease (ICD-10-CM), i.e. the patients for whom the code was I21
5An exception is local hospitals for which it is not compulsory. This does not affect our study since these
hospitals do not take care of AMI patients.
6It should be mentioned however that only 90% of the private sector was covered in 1998 and 95% in 1999.
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or I22. Before 35, heart attacks are often related to a heart disfunction. As a consequence, we
restrain our attention to the patients more than 35 following the OMS definition, which leaves us
with 421, 185 stays. As we cannot keep track of patients when they are transferred to another
hospital, we restrict our sample to patients who come from their place of residence. After deleting
observations with missing values for the variables used in our study (that are only very few), we
end up with 341, 861 stays for patients distributed across 1, 105 hospitals.
We match our dataset with the hospital records from the SAE survey (Statistiques Annuelles
des Etablissements de sante´) that was conducted every year over the 1998-2003 period. The SAE
survey contains some information on the municipality where each hospital is located, the number
of beds (in surgery and in total) and the number of days that beds are occupied (in surgery and
in total). The matching rate is very good and reaches 97% of the patients.
The municipality code in the SAE survey also allowed us to match our dataset with some
wealth variables at the municipality level coming from other sources. These variables will be
used in our estimations to take into account the spatial differences in the funding of public and
NFP hospitals. Indeed, local authorities sometimes take into account the local level of poverty
when dispatching the budget across hospitals. Our municipality variables include the municipal
unemployment rate computed from the 1999 population census, the median household income
from the 2000 Income Tax dataset and the existence of a poor area in the municipality (poor
areas being defined by a 1997 law under the label zones urbaines sensibles). Also, thanks to the
municipality code, we could identify the urban area in which hospitals are located.7 We computed
a local index of competition between hospitals within each urban area. This index is a Herfindahl
index at the urban area level using the number of patients in hospitals within each urban area.8
In our analysis, we will also take into account the size of the healthcare market surrounding each
patient’s hospital as it may affect their efficiency. This size is measured by the number of beds in
the urban area, the patient’s hospital being excluded. When constructing urban area variables,
7An urban area (aire urbaine) is defined as an urban center (which includes more than 5,000 jobs) and the
municipalities in its catchment area. There are 359 urban areas in mainland France and they do not cover the
whole territory (as some municipalities are excluded and remain rural).
8The Herfindahl index for an urban area u is Hu =
j∈u
⇣
pj
pu
⌘2
where j indices the hospitals, pj is the number
of patients in the hospital j, and pu =
j∈u
pj is the total number of patients within the urban area u. Hu increases
from 1
nu
to 1 as the concentration of patients increases, where nu is the number of hospitals in the urban area u.
When Hu =
1
nu
, the patients are equi-distributed between the nu hospitals. When Hu = 1, they are all treated
within one hospital.
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we were confronted with a few hospitals in municipalities which do not belong to any areas or to
several of them. We thus introduced some dummies for these two cases as controls. As we will use
hospital variables which should be time-invariant in our analysis (see Section 5 and 6), all hospital
and geographic variables are averaged across years.
3.2 Preliminary statistics
For each hospital, we computed a gross survival function for exit to death using the Kaplan-Meier
estimator. This estimator treats other exits (home return and transfers) as censored. As we are
mostly interested in hospital disparities across regions, we computed the average survival function
by region.9 Observations were weighted by the number of patients still at risk in the hospitals.10
We selected the region with the highest survival function (Alsace), the region with the lowest
survival function (Languedoc-Roussillon), and the Paris region (Ile-de-France) that is the most
densely populated. Graph 4 represents the survival functions of these three regions as well as their
confidence intervals (Graph A1 in appendix represents the survival functions for all the regions
and Table A1 ranks the regions according to survival after 15 days). It shows that the two extreme
average survival functions are significantly different.
[Insert Graph 4]
Table 1 reports some disparity indices between regions in the probability of dying within 1, 5,
10 and 15 days (defined as one minus the Kaplan-Meier). These indices are the max/min ratio,
the Gini index and the coefficient of variation. The Gini indices and coefficients of variation are
computed in two stages. First, we compute the average of a given individual variable (for instance,
a death dummy) by region. Then, we compute the regional disparity indices for the resulting
9We could have directly computed a survival function for each region. However, we believe that the relevant
unit at which the treatment of patients takes place is the hospital. Also, our approach at the hospital level parallels
the model presented in Section 5.
10When the length of stay increases, the number of patients in a given hospital decreases. Above a given length
of stay after which there is no patient at risk anymore, it is not possible to estimate the survival function. We
then arbitrarily considered that the hospital survival functions remained constant after this length of stay. When
we compute the average survival functions by region, this assumption does not have much effect for short/medium
lengths of stays. Indeed, only small hospitals do not have any patients at risk anymore for these lengths of stays.
As a consequence, we limited our analysis to lengths of stays below fifteen days to minimize the effect of our
assumption.
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variable (in our example, the regional proportion of deaths), weighting the observations by the
number of patients in the region. Global indices like the Gini index (.07) and the coefficient of
variation (.218) remain quite small and suggest that disparities are not systematic. The max/min
ratio shows that regional disparities are significant. Indeed, the difference in the probability of
death within 15 days between the Maximum (Languedoc-Roussillon) and the Minimum (Alsace)
is 80%. Interestingly, disparities are a bit larger for the probability of death within 1 day (Max/Min
ratio of 94%). This may be due to different behaviours across regions in transfers and home returns
in the early days of AMI stays.
As mentioned earlier, the regional disparities in mortality may be explained with some regional
disparities in demand factors (demographic shifters and secondary diagnosis) or in supply factors,
whether they are related to hospitals (treatments and establishment characteristics) or to the local
healthcare market structure. To disentangle these three types of effects, we present Gini indices
which are some global measures of disparities and are not sensitive to the level of magnitude as
the max/min ratio.11 We consider in the sequel that disparities are small when the index is inferior
to .1, they are moderate for an index from .1 to .2, they are large for an index from .2 to .3, and
they are very large for an index above .3.
We first consider variables related to patients which were averaged at the regional level. There are
significant disparities across regions for some demographic variables: the Gini index is moderate
for females aged 35 − 55 (.12) and males who are more than 85 (.11). For diagnoses, the Gini
index reaches .23 for surgical French DRGs (.23), .15 for the severity index12 and .13 for a history
of vascular diseases and for stroke. Note that the Gini index is most often moderate for diagnoses
related to specific behaviours before the heart attack such as obesity (.17), excessive smoking
(.16), and alcohol problems (.14). Regional disparities in the use of procedures are important. The
Gini index goes up to .53 for dilatations other than PTCA and .37 for the cabbage or coronary
artery bypass surgery (CABG). More widespread procedures like angioplasty and stent still have
a large Gini index which takes the value .28 and .21, respectively.
Overall, the Gini indices show that potential explanations of disparities in the propensity to die
can be related to demographic characteristics, diagnoses and procedures. One should keep in mind
11alternatively, we could also comment the results obtained with the coefficients of variation which are similar.
12We use Deyo’s adaptation of the Charlson co-morbidity index to measure the severity of co-morbidities (Deyo,
1992; Ghali, 1996). The Charlson index, which is expressed as a six-level variable, is constructed for each stay.
This index is greater than 0 when a surgical procedure has been carried out on the patient. Validation exercises
have shown that this index predicts well mortality in longitudinal data (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997).
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though that the explanatory power of a given variable when studying the regional disparities in
mortality is closely related to its variance and its effect on death. Considering the variance, the
different types of patient-specific variables still look like good candidates (even if their respective
importance is different).
[Insert Table 1]
We then computed regional disparity indices for the hospital and geographic variables used in
our regressions. Whereas hospital variables measure capacities and status (public, NFP and FP),
geographic variables are mostly meant to capture the effects related to the structure of the local
healthcare market (like competition). For a given variable, we constructed its regional average,
weighting the observations by the number of patients in the hospitals. The resulting regional
average is then used to compute disparity indices at the regional level. Results are reported in
Table 2. As previously, we only comment Gini indices.
There are large disparities across regions in the size of hospitals measured by the total number
of patients (.23) or the number of AMI patients (.27). Disparities are even larger for the number
of beds (.49) and the number of beds in surgery (.47). These disparities point out some sorting
of hospitals according to their size. Finally, disparities are smaller but still large for the hospital
status and more specifically for being a FP hospital (.24). The regional disparities in hospital
characteristics may thus play a role when trying to explain the regional disparities in mortality.
Concerning geographic variables, we observe some very large disparities in the number of beds
in the urban area (Gini index .66) which is not surprising as there is a lot of variation in the
population of regions. Disparities are also significant for the Herfindhal index computed at the
urban area level (.20). Indeed, hospitals are unevenly distributed in the territory, for historical
reasons, public policy and consequences of competition. This creates some regional differences in
average Herfindahl Index. Regional disparities in municipality variables capturing some geographic
heterogeneity in funding are at best moderate, the Gini index reaching .17 for the presence of a
poor area in the municipality.
[Insert Table 2]
In summary, demand and supply factors are all some potential candidates to explain the regional
disparities in mortality. We now present our empirical methodology to assess their respective
explanatory power.
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4 Econometric method
We first give a brief description of the econometric model explaining the propensity to die before
turning to a more formal presentation of our approach. We build our specification around hospital
units to properly take into account their heterogeneity and use a Cox duration model at the patient
level stratified by hospital. Hence, each hospital has its own hazard function which captures its
specific behaviour. Ridder and Tunali (1999) explain how to estimate this model using the stratified
partial likelihood estimator (SPLE) and establish the theoretical properties of the estimators.
Their methodology has been used in some studies related to education and unemployment, but
not in health economics. Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2000) apply their methodology to quantify
the effect of school on the job sickness of teachers and Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010) use it
to analyze the effect of location on finding a job in the Paris region.
The model contains some patient-specific explanatory variables (demographic shifters, diagnoses
and treatments), as well as a specific survival function for each hospital which is left unspecified.
The flexible modelling of the hospital heterogeneity allows us to recover some robust estimators
of the coefficients of patient-specific explanatory variables. These coefficients are then used in the
estimation of the hospital survival functions, which are in turn averaged at the regional level to
study the regional disparities in mortality net of the effect of patient-specific variables.
We then link the remaining regional disparities to some local differences in hospital and geographic
characteristics. For that purpose, we make the additional assumption that the hospital hazards
write multiplicatively as the product of a hospital fixed effect and a baseline hazard. We show
how to estimate the hospital fixed effects using moment conditions. We explain them with hospital
and geographic variables and finally average the model at the regional level to perform a regional
variance analysis.13
We now present our approach more formally. For each patient, we observe the length of stay
in the hospital and the type of exit (death, home return or transfer). In the sequel, we only study
exit to death. All other exits are treated as censored. We specify the hazard function of a patient
i in a hospital j (i) as:
λ (t |Xi, j (i)) = θj(i) (t) exp (Xiβ) (1)
13A tempting alternative approach is to estimate all the coefficients in one stage introducing all the patient,
hospital and geographic variables in a simple Cox model. However, such an approach does not take into account
the hospital unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, standard errors of the coefficients may be highly biased (see
Moulton, 1990). Our approach properly takes into account the hospital unobserved heterogeneity.
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where θj (·) is the instantaneous hazard function for hospital j, Xi are the patient-specific explana-
tory variables and β are their effect on death. The model is estimated maximizing the stratified
partial likelihood. The contribution to likelihood of a patient i who dies after a duration ti is his
probability of dying conditionally on someone at risk in his hospital dying after this duration. It
writes:
Pi =
exp (Xiβ)
i∈Ωj(i)(ti)
exp (Xiβ)
(2)
where Ωj (t) is the set of patients at risk at day t in hospital j, i.e. the set of patients that are
still in hospital j after staying there for t days. The partial likelihood to be maximized then
writes: L = Π
i
Pi. Denote bβ the estimated coefficients of patient-specific explanatory variables. It
is possible to compute the integrated hazard function Θj (t) of any hospital j using the estimator
proposed by Breslow (1974). It writes:
bΘj (t) = t
0
I (Nj (s) > 0)
i∈Ωj(s)
exp
⇣
Xibβ
⌘dNj (s) (3)
where I (·) is the indicator function, Nj (s) = card Ωj (s), and dNj (s) is the number of patients
exiting from hospital j between the days s and s+1. From the Breslow’s estimator, we compute a
survival function for each hospital j as exp(−bΘj (t)) (an estimator of its standard error is recovered
using the delta method). The hospital survival functions will be averaged at the regional level to
study regional disparities in mortality after any number of days. As the hospital hazards are left
completely unspecified, the study of regional disparities in death using regional averages remains
very general.
We then study the determinants of hospital disparities by specifying the hospital hazard rates
in a multiplicative way:
θj (t) = αjθ (t) (4)
where αj is a hospital fixed effect and θ (t) is a baseline hazard common to all hospitals. We show
in appendix how to estimate the parameters using empirical moments derived from (4).14 Note
14In doing so, we depart from the log-linear estimation method proposed by Gobillon, Magnac and Selod
(2010). Our approach is more adequate when exits are scarce as in our case. Indeed, Gobillon, Magnac
and Selod split the timeline into K intervals denoted [tk−1, tk]. Introduce θk = tk
tk−1
θ (t) dt/ (tk − tk−1) and
yjk = [Θj (tk) − Θj (tk−1)] / (tk − tk−1). Integrating (4) over each interval and taking the log, they get: ln yjk =
lnαj + ln θk. yjk is not observed but can be replaced by a consistent estimator: byjk =
hbΘj (tk) − bΘj (tk−1)
i
/djk
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that we need an identifying restriction since αj and θ (t) can be identified separately only up to a
multiplicative constant. We impose for convenience that: 1
N
P
t
Ntθ (t) = 1 where Nt is the number
of patients still at risk at the beginning of day t and N =
P
t
Nt. After some calculations (see
appendix), we get:
θ (t) =
 
1
N2
X
j,t
N jNtθj (t)
!−1 
1
N
X
j
N jθj (t)
!
(5)
αj =
 
1
N j
X
t
Njtθ (t)
!−1 
1
N j
X
t
Njtθj (t)
!
(6)
where Njt is the number of patients at risk at time t in hospital j, N
j =
P
t
Njt, and the sum on
t,
P
t
, goes from t = 1 to t = T (here, we fixed T = 30 for convenience). An estimator of θ (t)
denoted bθ (t) can be obtained, replacing θj (t) by the estimator bθj (t) = bΘj (t) − bΘj (t − 1) on the
right-hand side of equation (5). An estimator of αj denoted bαj can then be derived, replacing
θj (t) and θ (t), respectively by bθj (t)and bθ (t), on the right-hand side of equation (6). We show in
appendix how to compute the covariance matrices of bθ = ⇣bθ (1) , ..., bθ (T )⌘0 and bα = (bα1, ..., bαJ)0.
We then explain the hospital fixed effects with some hospital and geographic variables denoted
Zj. We specify: αj = exp (Zjγ + ηj) where γ are the effects of hospital and geographic variables
on death, and ηj includes some unobserved hospital and geographic effects. For a given hospital
j, taking the log and replacing the hospital fixed effect with its estimator, we get:
ln bαj = Zjγ + ηj + φj (7)
where φj = ln bαj − ln αj is the sampling error on the hospital fixed effect. Equation (7) can
be estimated using weighted least squares where the weight is the number of patients in the
hospitals. The standard errors and R-square (adjusted to take into account the sampling error),
where djk is the amount of time in interval [tk−1, tk] where at least one patient is at risk. The equation to estimate
is then: ln byjk = lnαj +ln θk +ψjk where ψjk = ln byjk − ln yjk is the sampling error. This equation can be estimated
with standard linear panel methods. The authors use weighted least square where the weights are the number of
individuals at risk at the beginning of the interval. A limit of this method is that ln yjk can be replaced by its
estimator ln byjk only if byjk 6= 0. When it is not the case, observations should be discarded from the sample. When
implementing this approach in our case, this could be an issue as exits are scarce and a significant number of
observations should be discarded when the time spent in the hospitals gets long. In practice however, the results
obtained with the two approaches are quite similar.
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are computed as proposed by Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010). Note that for a given hospital,
equation (7) is well defined only when there is at least one patient dying in the hospital over the
1998 − 2003 period (otherwise the quantity bαj from which we take the log would be zero). This
condition may not be verified for hospitals that have only a few patients. In fact, these hospitals
have a negligible weight and they are discarded from our sample. We finally average equation (7)
at the regional level and conduct a variance analysis for the resulting equation.
5 Results
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the first-stage equation (2). The demographic character-
istics have the usual effect on the propensity to die. Females are more likely to die than males.
This is consistent with care being more protective for males than for females possibly because of
biological differences like the smaller target vessel size and the more important vessel tortuosity
of females (Milcent et al., 2007). Also, the propensity to die increases with age.
Among variables related to the diagnosis, the severity index is found to have a positive effect on
the propensity to die. Intuitively, one also expects secondary diagnoses to have a positive effect as
they deteriorate health. This is true empirically for renal failure, stroke, heart failure, conduction
disease, alcohol. Other secondary diagnoses have a more surprising negative effect: diabetes,
obesity, excessive smoking, vascular disease, peripheral arterial disease, previous coronary artery
disease, and hypertension. These results may be explained by preventive health care. Indeed,
these secondary diagnoses may point at patients who are monitored more carefully before and
after having a heart attack (Milcent, 2005).
All treatments have the expected negative effect on the propensity to die: CABG, catheterism,
PTCA, other dilatation and stent. The stent, which is the most innovative procedure, has the
strongest negative effect. After taking into account these treatments, the DRG index capturing
the heaviness of surgical procedures has a positive effect on the propensity to die. This can reflect
the increased chances of dying because of more cumbersome and risky surgery.
[Insert Table 3]
From the estimated coefficients bβ, we constructed an integrated hazard for each hospital using
Breslow’s estimator and averaged the corresponding hospital survival functions by region (weight-
ing by the number of patients at risk in the hospitals).15 Regions at extremes are the same as
15This kind of aggregation is quite common in the labour literature. For instance, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
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when studying the raw data: Alsace (at the German border) usually exhibits the highest survival
function and Languedoc-Roussillon (in the South-East) the lowest. Graph 5 represents the survival
functions (as well as their confidence intervals) for these two extremes and for Ile-de-France (The
Paris region).16 The difference between the extreme regions is smaller but still significant.
[Insert Graph 5]
We quantify the regional disparities computing the same disparity indices as for raw data for the
probability of death within 1, 5, 10 and 15 days (defined as one minus the survival function of the
model). Results reported in Table 4 show that the difference in the probability of death within
15 days between the extreme regions has decreased from 80% to 47% (this corresponds to a 41%
decrease). More systematic disparity indices like the coefficient of variation and the Gini index
also decrease, but to a lesser extent (by 19% and 17%, respectively). In a variance-analysis spirit,
we defined a pseudo-R2 as one minus the ratio between the variance in the probability of dying
within a given number of days computed from the model and the variance computed from raw
data. At 1 and 5 days, the pseudo-R2 is nearly 60%. Hence, patient characteristics and treatments
would explain more than half of the regional disparities in early death. However, it is lower at 10
days (48%), and decreases even more to reach 40% at 15 days. These results suggest that part
of the early regional disparities may be due to different timings of death events across regions.
Also, there may be some specific regional behaviour for transfers and home returns which would
affect the local composition of patients and hence would have an impact on the difference between
the hospital survival functions obtained from the model and from the Kaplan-Meier estimators.
Interestingly, the ranking of regions obtained for death within 15 days is not that different from the
one obtained from the raw data (unweighted rank correlation: .70). This means that the ranking
(1999) estimate a wage equation that includes some firm fixed effects. They then compute some industry fixed effects
as the averages of the estimated firm fixed effects for firms belonging to each industry (weighting the observations
by the number of workers in the firms).
16Graph A3 in appendix represents the survival functions for all the regions and Table A2 ranks the regions
according to survival after 15 days. Curves obtained with the model are not strictly comparable with those
obtained from raw data with the Kaplan-Meier estimator as instantaneous hospital hazards were normalized with
an ad-hoc rule. To get close to comparability, we multiplied instantaneous hospital hazards by a constant which
was chosen in such a way that in absence of hospital heterogeneity (i.e. θj (t) = θ (t) for all t), the expected
integrated hazard at day 1 is equal to the expected integrated hazard obtained from the raw data (defined as minus
the logarithm of the Kaplan-Meier estimator). This normalization allows to obtain an average survival function of
the same magnitude as the one obtained from raw data with the Kaplan-Meier estimator.
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of regions does not change much after taking into account individual variables.
[Insert Table 4]
We then supposed that each instantaneous hospital hazard writes multiplicatively as the product
of a hospital fixed effect and a baseline hazard. The parameters of the multiplicative model are
estimated using empirical moments as explained in the previous section. Graph 6 displays the
baseline hazard and the confidence interval at each day. Remember that the weighted average
of the instantaneous baseline hazards is normalized to zero. We obtain that the baseline hazard
decreases sharply in the first two days and then more smoothly until the eighth day. It remains
constant afterward. The sharp decrease just after entry in the hospital can be explained by violent
deaths that are quite common in early days of heart attacks.
[Insert Graph 6]
We then regress the hospital fixed effects on a set of hospital and geographic variables. Results
are reported in Table 5 (estimated regional dummies corresponding to the specification of Column
3 are reported in Appendix A3). When we only introduce hospital variables (Column 1), the
adjusted-R2 is quite low at .13.17 It is larger at .23 when only geographic variables enter the
specification (Column 2). Interestingly, when introducing both groups of variables (Column 3),
the R2 at .28 is below the sum of R2 of the two separate regressions (.36), which suggests that
variables are quite correlated. Also, it is higher than the R2 of each separate regression, which
suggests that each of the two groups has some explanatory power of its own.
We now comment on the sign of the estimated coefficients for the full specification (Column 3).
As regards the effect of hospital characteristics, we find that the propensity to die is nearly the
same in FP hospitals and public hospitals. This result may look surprising but it comes from the
fact that we take into account innovative treatments (mainly angioplasty and stent). If we drop
the variables related to innovative treatments from the first-stage specification, the propensity to
die in public hospitals becomes higher than in FP hospitals (see Table A3 in appendix). Hence,
the higher efficiency of FP hospitals would come from a wider use of innovative treatments. We
also find that the propensity to die in a NFP hospital is lower than in a public or an FP hospital.
The proportion of patients in the hospital treated for an AMI has a negative and significant
effect. It is possible that hospitals concentrating AMI patients have specialized in heart-related
17The adjusted-R2 takes into account the sampling error.
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pathologies and thus have a higher efficiency. The number of beds as well as their occupation rate
has no effect on mortality. The propensity to die is lower in hospitals with a higher proportion
of beds in surgery (whether taking into account innovative treatments or not). In fact, hospitals
with a high concentration of beds in surgery could have specialized in serious diseases and have
a higher-quality staff. The propensity to die also decreases with the occupation rate of beds in
surgery (significantly at 10% only). It is possible that hospitals with a higher occupation rate are
more efficient and more likely to attract patients.
The Herfindahl index which measures the local concentration of patients has a significant
negative effect. This result suggests that when patients in an area are distributed across a few
large hospitals rather than many small ones, the mortality in that area tends to be lower. The
number of beds in the urban area has a positive significant effect which turns out to be negative
but not significant when innovative treatments are not taken into account. An interpretation can
be that larger markets propose more innovative treatments but would also lead to some inefficiency
in healing patients. These effects would compensate but after taking into account the innovative
treatments, only the net inefficiency effect would remain. The municipality variables do not have
much effect. The presence of a poor area in the municipality has a positive effect on mortality,
but it is significant only at the 10% level.
At last, regional dummies always have a negative effect compared to the reference (Languedoc-
Roussillon) and their effect is most often significant. Differences may be explained by unobserved
regional factors such as the regional differences in hospital budgets and in the propensity to transfer
patients when they are likely to die. Note that standard errors are quite large and two regions
need to be far enough in the distribution of regional effects for the difference between their effects
to be significant. The ranking of regional effects is only weakly correlated with the probability
to die within 15 days obtained from raw data (unweighted rank correlation: .20) and with that
obtained from the model (unweighted rank correlation: −.11).
[Insert Table 5]
We now study the variations in mortality at the regional level. Taking the logarithm of equation
(1) with the multiplicative assumption (4), and computing the average for any region r gives:
1
N r i|j(i)∈r
ln λ (t |Xi, j (i)) = X
r
β + ln α
r
+ θ (t) (8)
where N r is the number of patients in region r, X
r
is the regional average of individual explanatory
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variables and ln α
r
is the regional average of hospital fixed effects weighted by the number of
patients in the hospitals. This equation states how at the regional level, the average hazard at
t days for patients entering an hospital for an AMI relates to their average characteristics, the
average hospital effects, and the baseline hazard at t days. We qualitatively assess the relative
explanatory power of right-hand side terms in (8) computing their variance and their correlation
with the left-hand side term (in a way similar to Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). In fact,
the larger the variance and the correlation, the higher the explanatory power. In practice, as β and
ln α
r
are not observed, we use their estimators bβ and dln αr (the latter being defined as the regional
weighted average of[ln αj) to compute the right-hand side terms. An estimator of the left-hand side
term is obtained from the sum of right-hand side terms. Using the same approach, we also assess
the explanatory power of X
r
s
bβ for some sub-groups Xrs of explanatory variables. Importantly, note
that this procedure measures the explanatory power ex ante before any filtering process of patients
through transfers or home returns. We can further assess the explanatory power of hospital and
geographic variables. Taking the log of the expression of hospital fixed effects and averaging at
the regional level, we get:
ln α
r
= Z
r
γ + ηr
where Z
r
and ηr are the regional averages of explanatory variables and random terms, respectively.
We can assess the explanatory power of Z
r
γ and Z
r
sγ, for some sub-groups Z
r
s of explanatory
variables, in the same way as for individual variables (replacing γ by its estimator).
We find that individual variables have a far larger power than hospital effects in explaining re-
gional disparities in mortality (see Table 6a). Indeed, their variance is five to six times larger.
Interestingly, among the individual variables, it is the innovative treatments which have the largest
explanatory power. This means that regional disparities in innovative treatments are a key factor
in explaining regional disparities in mortality. This has some important consequences for the
regional funding of innovative equipment. Of course, the regional composition in age and sex
also plays a role. Note that the sum of variances for groups of individual variables is far smaller
than their sum. This comes from fairly large correlations between groups. In particular, regions
where patients are aged and mostly females are also those in which more innovative treatments are
performed (correlation between the demographic effects and the effect of innovative treatments:
.57).
[Insert Table 6a]
The hospital and geographic effects have a larger variance than the demographic composition
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effects, which suggests that their role in explaining regional disparities is significant. Concerning
regional disparities in hospital fixed effects, the local composition by ownership status does not
have a noticeable explanatory power (Table 6b). As regards geographic variables, the local size
of the surrounding market (measured by the local number of beds except those in the patient’s
hospital) and the Herfindahl index play a significant role.18 At last, residual local effects captured
by regional dummies have a large variance. This means that some unobserved regional factors
have a large effect on regional disparities in AMI death.
[Insert Table 6b]
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the regional disparities in mortality for patients admitted in hospitals for
a heart attack. This was done using a unique matched patients-hospitals dataset over the 1998-
2003 period constructed from exhaustive administrative records. For patients, this dataset contains
some information on demographic characteristics (sex and age), diagnoses and treatments. For
hospitals, it gives some details on the location, status, rules of reimbursement and the capacity.
We showed that regional disparities are fairly large. The difference in mortality rate between the
extreme regions reaches 80%. We analyzed the causes of these disparities using a Cox duration
model stratified by hospital. The model contains some patient-specific explanatory variables
(demographic shifters, diagnoses and treatments), as well as a specific survival function for each
hospital which is left unspecified. The flexible modelling of the hospital heterogeneity allows
us to recover some robust estimators of the coefficients of patient-specific explanatory variables.
These coefficients are then used in the estimation of the hospital survival functions which capture
the differences in hospital behaviours when treating patients. Hospital survival functions are
in turn averaged at the regional level to study the regional disparities in mortality net of the
effect of patient-specific variables. Regional disparities are then lower but remain significant: the
difference in mortality rate between the extreme regions is still 47%. Interestingly, the extent to
which patients are treated with innovative procedures at the regional level plays a major role in
18Note that the local size of the surrounding market and the local concentration of patients have an effect that is
positively correlated with hospital fixed effects. However, their correlation with the overall integrated hazard (last
column in Table 6b) is negative. This is because these effects are more than compensated by regional fixed effects
and the effects of innovative treatments.
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the decrease of the disparities.
We then assessed to what extent the remaining regional disparities could be explained with hospi-
tals’ characteristics and competition between hospitals. This was done regressing hospital survival
functions on hospital and geographic variables, and averaging the model at the regional level.
We found that once treatments have been taken into account, the status of hospitals does not
play much. By contrast, the local concentration of patients still plays a significant role. When
patients in an area are distributed across a few large hospitals rather than many small ones, the
mortality in that area tends to be lower. After hospital and geographic variables have been taken
into account, some significant regional disparities still remain.
A limit of our analysis is that patients were not tracked in the data when they were transferred
to another hospital. For patients who were transferred, we had to consider that the length of
stay was censored. An interesting extension of our work would be to study how hospitals interact
through transfers and to what extent the transfer of patients to another hospital affects their
propensity to survive. Space may play a major role in transfers as some hospitals are isolated and
others are close to an establishment specialized in heart surgery. It should be possible to conduct
such analyses in the future when the most recent data which track patients are made available for
research.
7 Appendix: second-stage estimation
In this appendix, we explain how to construct some estimators of the baseline hazard and hospital
fixed effects. We first average equation (4) across time, weighting the observations by the number
of patients at risk at each date. We obtain:
1
N
X
t
Ntθj (t) = αj
1
N
X
t
Ntθ (t)
where Nt is the number of patients at risk at the beginning of period t, N =
P
t
Nt with
P
t
the
sum from 1 to T days (with T = 30 in the application). A natural identifying restriction is that
the average of instantaneous hazards equals one: 1
N
P
t
Ntθ (t) = 1. We obtain:
αj =
1
N
X
t
Ntθj (t) (9)
It could be possible to construct an estimator of hospital fixed effects from this formula, but
weights (namely: Nt) are not hospital-specific and thus do not reflect hospital specificities. Hence,
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we propose another estimator of hospital fixed effects in the sequel which we believe better capture
hospital specificities.
We also average equation (4) across hospitals, weighting by the number of patients at risk (summed
across all dates) in each hospital. We get:
1
N
X
j
N jθj (t) =
1
N
 X
j
N jαj
!
θ (t)
where N j =
P
t
Njt with Njt the number of patients at risk in hospital j at the beginning
of date t (such that N =
P
j
N j). Replacing αj with its expression (9), we obtain: θ (t) = 
1
N2
P
j,t
N jNtθj (t)
!−1 
1
N
P
j
N jθj (t)
!
. An estimator of the hazard rate at date t in hospital j
can be constructed from Breslow’s estimator such that bθj (t) = bΘj (t) − bΘj (t − 1). A natural
estimator of the baseline hazard is then:
bθ (t) =  1
N2
X
j,t
N jNtbθj (t)
!−1 
1
N
X
j
N jbθj (t)
!
We then construct an estimator of a given hospital fixed effect αj averaging equation (4) across
time for this hospital and weighting by the number of patients at risk at the beginning of each
day in this hospital. We obtain:
1
N j
X
t
Njtθj (t) = αj
1
N j
X
t
Njtθ (t)
An estimator of the hospital fixed effect is then:
bαj =
 
1
N j
X
t
Njtbθ (t)
!−1 
1
N j
X
t
Njtbθj (t)
!
(10)
We also computed the asymptotic variances of bθ = ⇣bθ (1) , ..., bθ (T )⌘0 and bα = (bα1, ..., bαJ)0, denoted
Vθ et Vα, with the delta method. Indeed, the covariance matrix of bθJ = ⇣bθ1 (1) , ..., bθJ (T )⌘0 can
be estimated from Ridder et Tunali (1999). Its estimator is noted bVθJ . We can then compute the
estimators: bVθ = ⇣ ∂bθ
∂bθ0
J
⌘ bVθJ ⇣ ∂bθ0∂bθJ ⌘ and bVα = ⇣ ∂bα∂bθ0J ⌘ bVθJ ⇣ ∂bα0∂bθJ ⌘. The vectors ∂bθ∂bθJ and ∂bα∂bθJ are given
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by:
∂bθ (t)
∂bθk (τ) = NN
kP
j,t
N jNtbθj (t)1{t=τ} − NN
kNτ"P
j,t
N jNtbθj (t)#2
X
j
N jbθ (t) (11)
∂bαj
∂bθk (τ) = NkτP
t
Nj,tbθ (t)1{k=j} − bαj
P
t
Nj,t
∂bθ(t)
∂bθk(τ)P
t
Nj,tbθ (t) (12)
In practice, to simplify the computations, we neglected the second term on the right-hand side
of (12). This is only a slight approximation that does not have much impact on the estimated
variance of bαj. It amounts to neglect in (10) the variations of 1NjP
t
Njtbθ (t) with respect to the
terms bθj (t) compared to the variations of 1NjP
t
Njtbθj (t). Put differently, bθ (t) is supposed to be
non-random in (10).
References
[1] Abowd M., Kramarz F. and D. N. Margolis (1999), “High wage workers and high wage firms”,
Econometrica, 67(2), pp. 251–333.
[2] Blomqvist A. (1991), “The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance,
and medical care”, Journal of Health Economics, 10(4), pp. 411-432.
[3] Breslow N.E. (1974), “Covariance Analysis of Censored Survival Data”, Biometrics, 30, pp.
89-99.
[4] Combes PPh., Duranton G. and L. Gobillon (2008), “Spatial Wage Disparities: Sorting
Matters”, Journal of Urban Economics, 63(2), pp. 723-742.
[5] Combes PPh. and H. Overman (2004), “The Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities in
the European Union”, in Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, vol. 4, pp. 2845-2910,
Henderson V. and J.F. Thisse (eds.), Elsevier-North Holland, Amsterdam.
[6] Cutler D.M. and J.R. Horwitz (1998), “Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit
States: Why and What Effects?”, NBER Working Paper 6672.
26
[7] Deyo R., Cherkin D. and M. Ciol (1992), “Adapting a clinical comorbidity index for use with
ICD-9-CM administrative databases”, Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 45, pp. 613-619.
[8] Dormont B. and C. Milcent (2002), “Quelle re´gulation pour les hoˆpitaux publics franc¸ais?”,
Revue d’Economie Politique, 17(2), pp. 117-142.
[9] Dormont B. and C. Milcent (2006), “Innovation diffusion under budget constraint”, Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique, Forthcoming.
[10] Duranton G. and V. Monastiriotis (2002),“Mind the Gaps: The Evolution of Regional In-
qualities in the U.K. 1982-1987”, Journal of Regional Science, 42(2), pp. 219-265.
[11] Gaynor M. (2006), “What do we know about competition and quality in health care mar-
kets?”, NBER Working Paper 12301.
[12] Geweke J., Gowrisankaran G. and R. Town (2003), “Bayesian Inference For Hospital Quality
in a Selection Model”, Econometrica, 71, pp. 1215-1238.
[13] Ghali W., Hall R., Rosen A., Ash, A. and M. Moskowitz (1996), “Searching for an improved
clinical comorbidity index for use with ICD-9-CM administrative data”, Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology, 49, pp. 273-278.
[14] Gobillon L., Magnac T. and H. Selod (2010), “The effect of location on finding a job in the
Paris region”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming.
[15] Gowrisankaran G. and R. Town (1999), “Estimating quality of Care in Hospitals Using In-
strumental Variables”, Journal of Health Economics, 18, pp. 747-67.
[16] Gowrisankaran G. and R. Town (2003), “Competition, Payers, and Hospital Quality”, Health
Services, 38, pp. 1403-1422.
[17] Hamilton B. and V. Hamilton (1997), “Estimating surgical volume-outcome relationships
applying survival models: accounting for frailty and hospital fixed effects”, Health Economics,
6, pp. 383-395.
[18] Hansman H.B. (1996), The ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, Havard University Press.
[19] Hart O.D. and B. Holmstrom (1987), “The theory of contracts”, in Advances in Economic
Theory, Bewley T. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
27
[20] Ho V. and B. Hamilton (2000), “Hospital mergers and acquisitions: Does market consolidation
harm patients?”, Journal of Health Economics, 19(5), pp. 767-791.
[21] Johansson S.R. (1991), “The health transition: the cultural inflation of morbidity during the
decline of mortality”, Health transition review, 1, pp. 39-68.
[22] Jollis J., Peterson E., DeLong E., Mark D., Collins S., Muhlbaier L. and D. Prior (1994),
“The Relation between the Volume of Coronary Angioplasty Procedures at Hospitals Treating
Medicare Beneficiaries and Short-Term Mortality”, The New England Journal of Medicine,
24(331), pp. 1625-1629.
[23] Kessler D. and M. McClellan (2000), “Is hospital competition socially wasteful?”, Quaterly
Journal of Economics, 115(2), pp. 577-615.
[24] Kessler D. and M. McClellan (2002), “The effects of hospital ownership on medical produc-
tivity”, RAND Journal of Economics, 33(3), pp. 488-506.
[25] Lancaster T. (1990), The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge.
[26] Lien H., Chou S. and J. Liu (2008), “Hospital ownership and performance: Evidence from
stroke and
[27] cardiac treatment in Taiwan”, Journal of Health Economics, 27, pp. 1208–1223.
[28] Lindeboom M. and M. Kerkhofs (2000), “Multistate Models for Clustered Duration Data
- an Application to Workplace Effects on Individual Sickness Absenteeism”, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 82(4), pp. 668-684.
[29] Lindeboom, M. and E. van Doorslaer (2004), “Cut-point Shift and Index Shift in Self-reported
Health”, Journal of Health Economics, 23, pp. 1083-1099.
[30] McClellan M. and D. Staiger (1999) “The Quality of Health Care Providers”, NBER Working
Paper 7327.
[31] McClellan M. and D.O. Staiger (2000), “Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-
for-Profit Hospitals”, in The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-
Profit Institutions, D.M. Cutler ed., University of Chicago Press.
28
[32] McGuire T.G. (2000), “Physician agency”, in Handbook of Health Economics, pp. 461-536,
Culyer A.J. and J.P. Newhouse (eds.), Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[33] Milcent C. (2005), “Hospital Ownership, Reimbursement Systems and Mortality rates”,
Health Economics, 14, pp. 1151–1168.
[34] Milcent C., Dormont B., Durand-Zaleski I. and P.G. Steg (2007), “Gender Differences in
Hospital Mortality and Use of Percutaneous Coronary Intervention in Acute Myocardial In-
farction”, Circulation, 115(7), pp. 823-826.
[35] Milgrom P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs.
[36] Mion G. and P. Naticchioni, (2008), “The Spatial Sorting and Matching of Skills and Firms”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[37] Moulton B. (1990), “An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Vari-
ables on Micro Units”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(2), pp. 334-338.
[38] Newhouse J. (1970), “Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions”, American Economic Re-
view, 60(1), pp. 64-74.
[39] Newhouse J.P. (1996), “Reimbursing health plans and health providers: efficiency in produc-
tion versus selection”, Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), pp. 1236-1263.
[40] Pauly M.V. and M. Redish (1973), “The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians’ cooperative”,
American Economic Review, 63, pp. 87-99.
[41] Pauly M.V. (1990), “The rational nonpurchase of long-term-care insurance”, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 98(1), pp. 153-168.
[42] Picone G., Shin-Yi C. and F. Sloan (2002), “Are for-profit hospital conversions harmful to
patients and to Medicare ?”, RAND Journal of Economics, 33(3), pp. 507-523.
[43] Propper C., Burgess S. and K. Green (2004), “Does competition between hospitals improve
the quality of care? Hospital death rate and the NHS internal market”, Journal of Public
Economics, 88(7-8), pp. 1247-1272.
29
[44] Ridder G. and I. Tunali (1999), “Stratified partial likelihood estimation”, Journal of Econo-
metrics, 92(2), pp. 193-232.
[45] Shortell S.M. and E.F.X. Highes (1998), “The effects of Regulation, Competition, and Own-
ership on Mortality Rates Among Hospital Inpatients”, New England Journal of Medecine,
318, pp. 1100-1107.
[46] Silverman E.M.and J.S. Skinner (2001), “Are For-Profit Hospitals Really different? Medicare
Upcoding and Market Structure”, NBER working paper 8133.
[47] Sloan F., Picone, G., Taylor D. and S. Chou (2001), “Hospital Ownership and Cost and
Quality of Care: Is There a Dime’s Worth of Difference?”, Journal of Health Economics,
20(1), pp. 1-21.
[48] Sutton M. and P. Lock (2000), “Regional Differences in Health Care Delivery: implications
for a national resource allocation formula”, Health Economics, 9, pp. 547-559.
[49] Tay A. (2003), “Assessing competition in hospital care markets: The importance of accounting
for quality differentiation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 34(4), pp. 786-814.
[50] Town R. and G. Vistnes (2001), “Hospital Competition in HMO networks”, Journal of Health
Economics, 20, pp. 733-753.
[51] Wagstaff A. and E. van Doorslaer (2000), “Equity in Health Care Finance and Delivery”, in
Handbook of Health Economics, pp. 1723-1760, Culyer A.J. et J.P. Newhouse (eds.), Elsevier.
[52] Wray N., Hollinghsworth J., Petersen N., and C. Ashton (1997), “Case-Mix Adjustment Using
Administrative Databases: A Paradigm to Guide Future Research”, Medical Care Research
and Review, 54, pp. 326-356.
[53] Wu S. (2001), “Adapting to Heart Conditions: A Test of the Hedonic Treadmill”, Journal of
Health Economics, 20, pp. 495-508.
30
43#
#
Table#1:#disparity#indices#computed#from#regional#averages#of#individual#variables#
#
#
Mean#
#
Min#
#
Max#
#
Max/Min#
#
Std.#Dev.#
#
Coeff.#of#
variation#
Gini#
#
Proba.#of#death#within#1#day#(KM)# 0.019# 0.012# 0.023# 1.940# 0.003# 0.159# 0.086#
Proba.#of#death#within#5#days#(KM)# 0.056# 0.038# 0.066# 1.721# 0.008# 0.136# 0.073#
Proba.#of#death#within#10#days#(KM)# 0.090# 0.061# 0.107# 1.749# 0.011# 0.119# 0.062#
Proba.#of#death#within#15#days#(KM)# 0.129# 0.085# 0.153# 1.800# 0.016# 0.125# 0.065#
Female,#35Q55#years#old# 0.024# 0.015# 0.032# 2.145# 0.005# 0.220# 0.123#
Female,#55Q65#years#old# 0.026# 0.021# 0.034# 1.609# 0.003# 0.134# 0.073#
Female,#65Q75#years#old# 0.073# 0.060# 0.089# 1.475# 0.006# 0.088# 0.048#
Female,#75Q85#years#old# 0.112# 0.093# 0.134# 1.435# 0.009# 0.085# 0.046#
Female,#over#85#years#old# 0.088# 0.059# 0.110# 1.852# 0.014# 0.163# 0.090#
Male,#35Q55#years#old# 0.181# 0.135# 0.239# 1.771# 0.027# 0.152# 0.084#
Male,#55Q65#years#old# 0.135# 0.116# 0.158# 1.372# 0.014# 0.102# 0.057#
Male,#65Q75#years#old# 0.178# 0.145# 0.195# 1.343# 0.012# 0.066# 0.035#
Male,#75Q85#years#old# 0.137# 0.105# 0.159# 1.510# 0.017# 0.122# 0.067#
Male,#more#than#85#year#old# 0.046# 0.027# 0.062# 2.259# 0.010# 0.209# 0.115#
Excessive#smoking# 0.124# 0.062# 0.196# 3.160# 0.038# 0.310# 0.171#
Alcohol#problems# 0.012# 0.004# 0.017# 4.148# 0.003# 0.276# 0.151#
Obesity# 0.067# 0.018# 0.111# 6.273# 0.022# 0.323# 0.176#
Diabetes#mellitus# 0.155# 0.092# 0.208# 2.254# 0.026# 0.170# 0.085#
Hypertension# 0.301# 0.203# 0.373# 1.833# 0.041# 0.136# 0.074#
Renal#failure# 0.049# 0.028# 0.078# 2.760# 0.011# 0.216# 0.112#
Conduction#disease# 0.197# 0.134# 0.247# 1.843# 0.026# 0.131# 0.069#
Peripheral#arterial#disease# 0.063# 0.036# 0.109# 3.019# 0.015# 0.243# 0.122#
Vascular#disease# 0.044# 0.025# 0.078# 3.109# 0.013# 0.289# 0.149#
History#of#coronary#artery#disease# 0.041# 0.017# 0.070# 4.000# 0.012# 0.295# 0.158#
Stroke# 0.031# 0.020# 0.048# 2.448# 0.006# 0.202# 0.103#
Heart#failure# 0.158# 0.128# 0.204# 1.598# 0.020# 0.126# 0.069#
Cabbage#or#Coronary#Bypass#surgery# 0.008# 0.001# 0.036# 36.312# 0.008# 0.946# 0.434#
Catheter# 0.188# 0.130# 0.271# 2.081# 0.037# 0.197# 0.107#
Percutaneous#transluminal#coronary#
Angioplasty#(PTCA)# 0.047# 0.010# 0.106# 10.914# 0.028# 0.588# 0.312#
Dilatation#other#than#PTCA# 0.001# 0.000# 0.005# \\# 0.002# 1.301# 0.629#
Stent# 0.219# 0.107# 0.411# 3.836# 0.086# 0.395# 0.210#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI#dataset#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# variables# considered# here# are# initially# defined# at# the# patient# level.# We# construct# regional# variables# as# the# averages# of# patient#
variables#by#region.#Indices#are#computed#from#these#regional#variables.#
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#
Table#2:#disparity#indices#computed#from#regional#averages#of#hospital#and#geographic#variables#
#
#
#
Mean#
#
Min#
#
Max#
#
Max/Min#
#
Std.#Dev.#
#
Coeff.#of#
variation#
Gini#
#
Number#of#patients# 3786# 2363# 9644# 4.081# 1524# 0.402# 0.172#
Number#of#AMI#patients# 324# 173# 968# 5.585# 163# 0.503# 0.204#
Proportion#of#AMI#patients# 0.086# 0.061# 0.220# 3.581# 0.032# 0.374# 0.125#
Public# 0.780# 0.590# 0.935# 1.584# 0.107# 0.137# 0.076#
NotQforQprofit# 0.039# 0.000# 0.261# \\# 0.063# 1.594# 0.696#
ForQprofit# 0.181# 0.060# 0.367# 6.129# 0.089# 0.490# 0.267#
Unemployment#rate# 0.159# 0.126# 0.225# 1.789# 0.027# 0.169# 0.090#
Poor#area#in#the#municipality# 0.700# 0.363# 0.947# 2.612# 0.174# 0.249# 0.136#
Municipality#median#income# 13559# 11552# 17455# 1.511# 1198# 0.088# 0.043#
Proportion#of#beds#in#surgery# 0.393# 0.323# 0.451# 1.395# 0.033# 0.083# 0.046#
Number#of#beds#in#surgery# 503# 243# 3172# 13.062# 618# 1.229# 0.339#
Proportion#of#occupied#surgery#beds# 0.857# 0.781# 0.901# 1.153# 0.034# 0.040# 0.021#
Number#of#beds# 1267# 595# 8481# 14.253# 1665# 1.315# 0.348#
Proportion#of#occupied#beds# 0.824# 0.774# 0.865# 1.118# 0.025# 0.030# 0.017#
Number#of#beds#in#the#urban#area# 4275# 1107# 47033# 42.475# 9838# 2.301# 0.572#
Herfindahl#index#for#hospitals#in#the#
urban#area# 0.675# 0.130# 0.893# 6.874# 0.182# 0.269# 0.135#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# variables# considered# here# are# initially# defined# at# the# hospital# level.#We# construct# regional# variables# as# the# averages# of# hospital#
variables#by# region,#weighting#observations#by# the#number#of#AMI#patients# in# the#hospitals.# # Indices#are# computed# from# these# regional#
variables.#
# #
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Table#3:#estimated#coefficients#for#the#individual#variables,#death#
Variable# Estimate#
Female,#35Q55#years#old# <#reference#>#
#
Female,#55Q65#years#old# 0.546***#
(0.111)#
Female,#65Q75#years#old# 1.040***#
(0.096)#
Female,#75Q85#years#old# 1.378***#
(0.094)#
Female,#over#85#years#old# 1.742***#
(0.094)#
Male,#35Q55#years#old# Q0.352***#
(0.101)#
Male,#55Q65#years#old# 0.231**#
(0.099)#
Male,#65Q75#years#old# 0.813***#
(0.095)#
Male,#75Q85#years#old# 1.274***#
(0.094)#
Male,#over#85#years#old# 1.653***#
(0.095)#
Excessive#smoking# Q0.478***#
(0.041)#
Alcohol#problems# 0.342***#
(0.066)#
Obesity# Q0.247***#
(0.041)#
Diabetes#mellitus# Q0.058***#
(0.018)#
Hypertension# Q0.576***#
(0.016)#
Renal#failure# 0.369***#
(0.018)#
Conduction#disease# 0.875***#
(0.013)#
Peripheral#arterial#disease# Q0.025#
(0.024)#
Vascular#disease# Q0.444***#
(0.028)#
History#of#coronary#artery#disease# Q0.225***#
(0.029)#
Stroke# 0.298***#
(0.024)#
Heart#failure# 0.061***#
(0.014)#
Cabbage#or#Coronary#Bypass#surgery# Q0.499***#
(0.080)#
Cardiac#catheterization# Q1.279***#
(0.030)#
Percutaneous#Transluminal#Coronary#Angioplasty# Q0.683***#
(0.039)#
Dilatation#other#than#PTCA# Q0.602***#
(0.216)#
Percutaneous#revascularization#using#coronary#stents#(PCI#–#stenting)# Q1.032***#
(0.026)#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI#dataset#(1998Q2003).#Note:#***:#significant#at#1%;#**:#significant#at#5%;#*:#significant#at#10%.#Number#of#
observations:#341,861.#
Note:#the#coefficients#can#be#interpreted#as#follows.#Females,#aged#55Q65#are#100*(exp(0.546)Q1)=72.6%#more#likely#to#die#than#Females#
aged#35Q55.#
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Table#4:#disparity#indices#computed#from#
the#regional#probability#of#death#obtained#from#the#model#
#
#
Mean#
#
Min#
#
Max#
#
Max/Min#
#
Std.#Dev.#
#
Coeff.#of#
variation#
Gini#
#
Probability#of#death#within#1#day# 0.019# 0.015# 0.024# 1.558# 0.002# 0.108# 0.057#
Probability#of#death#within#5#days# 0.056# 0.049# 0.073# 1.476# 0.005# 0.091# 0.044#
Probability#of#death#within#10#days# 0.085# 0.074# 0.108# 1.453# 0.008# 0.095# 0.049#
Probability#of#death#within#15#days# 0.114# 0.099# 0.145# 1.465# 0.013# 0.116# 0.062#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI#dataset#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# the# probability# of# death#within# a# given# duration# of# stay# is# computed# for# every# region# as# follows.#We# first# compute# the# survival#
function# for#each#hospital# as# the#exponential#of#minus# the# integrated#hazard# computed# from# the#model#using#Breslow’s#estimator.# The#
probability#of#death# in#a#hospital# is# then#given#by#one#minus# the#survival# function.#For#a#given# region,# the#probability#of#death# is# finally#
defined#as#the#average#of#the#probabilities#of#death#of#all#hospitals#located#in#that#region,#weighting#the#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#
patients#in#the#hospitals.#
#
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Table#5:#regression#of#hospital#fixed#effects#on#hospital#and#geographic#variables,#exit#to#death#
#
Variable# Regression#(1)# Regression#(2)# Regression#(3)#
Constant# Q5.895***#
(0.215)#
Q6.899***#
(1.406)#
Q7.040***#
(1.496)#
Public#hospital# <#reference#>#
#
# <#reference#>#
#
ForQprofit#hospital# 0.286***#
(0.040)#
# 0.058#
(0.051)#
NotQforQprofit#hospital# 0.030#
(0.071)#
# Q0.113**#
(0.073)#
Proportion#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospital# Q1.047***#
(0.174)#
# Q0.688**#
(0.211)#
Number#of#beds#(in#log)# 0.105***#
(0.016)#
# 0.034#
(0.020)#
Occupation#rate#of#beds# 0.116#
(0.221)#
# 0.222#
(0.223)#
Proportion#of#beds#in#surgery# Q0.136#
(0.089)#
# Q0.290***#
(0.090)#
Occupation#rate#of#beds#in#surgery# Q0.246#
(0.160)#
# Q0.243#
(0.156)#
Median#municipality#income# # 0.202#
(0.139)#
0.249*#
(0.150)#
Presence#of#a#poor#area#in#the#municipality# # 0.097***#
(0.030)#
0.073**#
(0.031)#
Municipality#unemployment#rate# # 0.025#
(0.546)#
0.225#
(0.573)#
Herfindahl#index#for#the#healthcare#structure# # Q0.448***#
(0.058)#
Q0.427***#
(0.070)#
Regional#dummies# Non# Oui# Oui#
Number#of#hospitals# 789# 834# 789#
Corresponding#number#of#patients# 332,827# 333,810# 332,827#
AdjustedQR²# 0.132# 0.226# 0.281#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).##
Note:#***:#significant#at#1%;#**:#significant#at#5%;#*:#significant#at#10%.#We#introduced#a#dummy#for#the#municipality#not#to#be#in#a#urban#
area# (dummy% for% rural% area),# and# a# dummy# for# the# municipality# to# be# related# to# several# urban# areas# (dummy% for% multi.polarized%
municipality).#The#coefficients#can#be#interpreted#as#follows.#In#regression#(3),#patients#staying#in#a#notQforQprofit#hospital#are#Q100*(exp(Q
.113)Q1)=10.7%#less#likely#to#die#than#patients#in#public#hospitals.#
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Table#6:#regional#dummies#obtained#from#the#hospital#fixedQeffect#regression#
Region#code# Name# Coefficient# Ranking#on#raw#data#
91#
#
LanguedocQRousillon#
#
<#reference#>#
#
(1)#
41#
#
Lorraine#
#
Q0.162*#
(0.087)#
(19)#
25#
#
BasseQNormandie#
#
Q0.171*#
(0.089)#
(3)#
53#
#
Bretagne#
#
Q0.175**#
(0.079)#
(4)#
22#
#
Picardie#
#
Q0.180**#
(0.086)#
(2)#
72#
#
Aquitaine#
#
Q0.197***#
(0.075)#
(7)#
43#
#
FrancheQComté#
#
Q0.209**#
(0.099)#
(16)#
83#
#
Auvergne#
#
Q0.214**#
(0.088)#
(9)#
93#
#
ProvenceQAlpesQCôteQd'Azur#
#
Q0.216***#
(0.070)#
(11)#
74#
#
Limousin#
#
Q0.219**#
(0.101)#
(18)#
21#
#
ChampagneQArdenne#
#
Q0.219**#
(0.089)#
(10)#
26#
#
Bourgogne#
#
Q0.220**#
(0.088)#
(4)#
54#
#
PoitouQCharentes#
#
Q0.232***#
(0.086)#
(12)#
82#
#
RhôneQAlpes#
#
Q0.237***#
(0.073)#
(17)#
24#
#
Centre#
#
Q0.241***#
(0.082)#
(8)#
73#
#
MidiQPyrénées#
#
Q0.248***#
(0.077)#
(5)#
52#
#
Pays#de#la#Loire#
#
Q0.256***#
(0.078)#
(6)#
31#
#
NordQPasQdeQCalais#
#
Q0.275***#
(0.069)#
(13)#
42#
#
Alsace#
#
Q0.283***#
(0.098)#
(21)#
23#
#
HauteQNormandie#
#
Q0.320***#
(0.086)#
(15)#
11#
#
IleQdeQFrance#
#
Q0.431***#
(0.082)#
(20)#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).#
Note:#in#the#last#column,#the#ranking#of#the#regions#obtained#from#raw#data#is#reported#in#brackets.#The#coefficients#can#be#interpreted#in#
as# follows.# Patients# staying# in# a# hospital# located# in# Lorraine# are# Q100*(exp(Q.162)Q1)=15.0%# less# likely# to# die# than# patients# located# in# a#
hospital#in#LanguedocQRoussillon.#
#
49#
#
Table#7:#variance#analysis#for#the#probability#of#death#at#the#regional#level#
#
Group#of#variables#from#which#we#consider#the#effect# Variance# #
Integrated#hazard# 100.0%# #
Individual#variables#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 80.7%# #
#####Innovative#treatments# 26.1%# #
#####NonQinnovative#treatments# 0.0%# #
#####Diagnoses# 5.9%# #
#####Demographic#variables#(age#x#sex)# 14.0%# #
LogQhospital#fixed#effects#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)## 20.0%# #
Hospital#and#geographic#variables#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 17.0%# #
#####Hospital#variables# 1.2%# #
##########Status#and#mode#of#reimbursement# 0.2%# #
##########Proportion#of#AMI#patients# 1.3%# #
##########Beds#(capacity#and#occupation#rate)# 0.7%# #
####Geographic#Variables# 17.9%# #
##########Municipality#variables# 0.7%# #
###############IncomeQrelated#variables# 0.3%# #
###############Dummies#for#the#municipality#to#be#rural#or#multiQpolarized# 0.3%# #
##########Herfindahl#index#for#healthcare#structure# 14.6%# #
##########Regional#dummies# 16.7%# #
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# we# compute# some# regional# variables# from# patient# and# hospital# variables.# When# a# variable# is# defined# at# the# patient# level,# the#
corresponding#regional#variable#is#the#regional#average.#When#a#variable#is#defined#at#the#hospital#level,#the#corresponding#regional#variable#
is#the#regional#average,#weighting#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospitals.#The#effect#of#a#regional#variable#is#defined#
as#the#variable#times#its#coefficient,#and#the#effect#of#a#group#of#regional#variables#is#defined#as#the#sum#of#variables#times#their#coefficients.#
We#are#interested#in#the#variance#of#a#regional#variable#or#a#group#of#regional#variables.#In#the#second#column,#we#report#this#variance#as#a#
fraction#of#the#variance#of#the#average#integrated#hazard#for#the#region.#The#higher#the#variance,#the#larger#the#explanatory#power.#
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Table#8:#variance#analysis#for#the#probability#of#death#at#the#city#level#
#
Group#of#variables#from#which#we#consider#the#effect# Variance# #
Integrated#hazard# 100.0%# #
Individual#variables#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 72.6%# #
#####Innovative#treatments# 24.8%# #
#####NonQinnovative#treatments# 0.0%# #
#####Diagnoses# 3.1%# #
#####Demographic#variables#(age#x#sex)# 12.0%# #
LogQhospital#fixed#effects#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 38.5%# #
Hospital#and#geographic#variables#(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 4.8%# #
#####Hospital#variables# 0.6%# #
##########Status#and#mode#of#reimbursement# 0.1%# #
##########Proportion#of#AMI#patients# 0.1%# #
##########Beds#(capacity#and#occupation#rate)# 0.5%# #
####Geographic#Variables# 4.1%# #
##########Municipality#variables# 0.5%# #
###############IncomeQrelated#variables# 0.4%# #
###############Dummies#for#the#municipality#to#be#rural#or#multiQpolarized# 0.0%# #
##########Herfindahl#index#for#healthcare#structure# 2.1%# #
##########Regional#dummies# 1.0%# #
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# we# compute# some# city# variables# from# patient# and# hospital# variables.# When# a# variable# is# defined# at# the# patient# level,# the#
corresponding#city#variable#is#the#average#for#the#city.#When#a#variable#is#defined#at#the#hospital#level,#the#corresponding#city#variable#is#the#
average#for#the#city,#weighting#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospitals.#The#effect#of#a#city#variable#is#defined#as#the#
variable#times#its#coefficient,#and#the#effect#of#a#group#of#city#variables#is#defined#as#the#sum#of#variables#times#their#coefficients.#We#are#
interested#in#the#variance#of#a#city#variable#or#a#group#of#city#variables.#In#the#second#column,#we#report#this#variance#as#a#fraction#of#the#
variance#of#the#average#integrated#hazard#at#for#the#city.#The#higher#the#variance,#the#larger#the#explanatory#power.#
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Table#9:#variance#analysis#for#the#probability#of#death#at#the#regional#level,#
regression#of#the#integrated#hazard#at#5#days#and#15#days#
#
Regression#on:# %Integrated%hazard%at%5%days% Integrated%hazard%at%15%days% %
Group#of#variables#from#which#we#consider##
the#effect#
Variance# Variance# #
Integrated#hazard# 100.0%# 100.0%# #
Individual#variables#
(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 78.7%#
#
84.9%#
#
#####Innovative#treatments# 25.4%# 27.4%# #
#####NonQinnovative#treatments# 0.0%# 0.0%# #
#####Diagnoses# 5.8%# 6.2%# #
#####Demographic#variables#(age#x#sex)# 13.6%# 14.7%# #
LogQhospital#fixed#effects#
(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 15.4%# 25.2%# #
Hospital#and#geographic#variables#
(averaged#at#the#regional#level)# 13.4%# 21.3%# #
#####Hospital#variables# 1.1%# 1.2%# #
##########Status#and#mode#of#reimbursement# 0.2%# 0.4%# #
##########Proportion#of#AMI#patients# 2.0%# 0.8%# #
##########Beds#(capacity#and#occupation#rate)# 1.1%# 0.7%# #
####Geographic#Variables# 14.9%# 21.1%# #
##########Municipality#variables# 0.3%# 1.7%# #
###############IncomeQrelated#variables# 0.1%# 1.1%# #
###############Dummies#for#the#municipality#to#be##
###############rural#or#multiQpolarized# 0.2%# 0.4%# #
##########Herfindahl#index#for#healthcare#
##########structure# 11.9%# 18.5%# #
##########Regional#dummies# 18.2%# 22.4%# #
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI,#the#SAE,#and#the#municipality#datasets#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# we# compute# some# regional# variables# from# patient# and# hospital# variables.# When# a# variable# is# defined# at# the# patient# level,# the#
corresponding#regional#variable#is#the#regional#average.#When#a#variable#is#defined#at#the#hospital#level,#the#corresponding#regional#variable#
is#the#regional#average,#weighting#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospitals.#The#effect#of#a#regional#variable#is#defined#
as#the#variable#times#its#coefficient,#and#the#effect#of#a#group#of#regional#variables#is#defined#as#the#sum#of#variables#times#their#coefficients.#
We#are#interested#in#the#variance#of#a#regional#variable#or#a#group#of#regional#variables.#In#the#second#column,#we#report#this#variance#as#a#
fraction#of#the#variance#of#the#average#integrated#hazard#for#the#region.#The#higher#the#variance,#the#larger#the#explanatory#power.#
#
#
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#
Graph#1:#regional#probability#of#death#within#fifteen#days#(in#%)#
#
Note:# the#probability#of# death#within#15#days# is# computed# for# every# region#as# follows.#We# first# compute# the# survival# function# for# each#
hospital#using#the#KaplanQMeier#estimator,#where#all#exits#other#than#death#are#treated#as#censored.#The#probability#of#death#in#a#hospital#is#
then# given# by# one# minus# the# survival# function.# For# a# given# region,# the# probability# of# death# is# finally# defined# as# the# average# of# the#
probabilities#of#death#of#all#hospitals#located#in#that#region,#weighting#the#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospitals.#We#
represent#here#the#probability#of#death#within#15#days.#
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#
Graph#2:#probability#of#death#for#extreme#regions#and#Paris#region#(KaplanQMeier)#
#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI#dataset#(1998Q2003).#
Note:#the#probability#of#death#is#computed#for#every#region#as#follows.#We#first#compute#the#survival#function#for#each#hospital#using#the#
KaplanQMeier#estimator,#where#all#exits#other#than#death#are#treated#as#censored.#The#probability#of#death#in#a#hospital# is#then#given#by#
one#minus#the#survival#function.#For#a#given#region,#the#probability#of#death#is#finally#defined#at#the#average#of#the#probabilities#of#death#of#
all#hospitals#located#in#that#region,#weighting#the#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients#in#the#hospitals.#Confidence#intervals#for#the#
probability#of#death#of#each#region#are#represented#by#dashed#lines.#
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#
Graph#3:#probability#of#death#for#extreme#regions#and#Paris#region#(model)#
#
Source:#computed#from#the#PMSI#dataset#(1998Q2003).#
Note:# the#probability#of#death# is# computed# for# every# region#as# follows.#We# first# compute# the# survival# function# for# each#hospital# as# the#
exponential#of#minus#the#integrated#hazard#computed#from#the#model#using#Breslow’s#estimator.#The#probability#of#death#in#a#hospital#is#
then# given# by# one# minus# the# survival# function.# For# a# given# region,# the# probability# of# death# is# finally# defined# as# the# average# of# the#
probabilities#of#death#of#all#hospitals# located# in# that#region,#weighting#the#observations#by#the#number#of#AMI#patients# in# the#hospitals.#
Confidence#intervals#for#the#probability#of#death#of#each#region#are#represented#by#dashed#lines.#
#
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Graph#A1:#Map#of#the#French#Regions#
#
#
Note:#regions#are#identified#on#the#map#by#their#administrative#codes.#These#codes#are:#11:#IleQdeQFrance;#21:#ChampagneQArdenne;#22:#
Picardie;# 23:#HauteQNormandie;# 24:#Centre;# 25:#BasseQNormandie;# 26:#Bourgogne;# 31:#Nord#PasQdeQCalais;# 41:# Lorraine;# 42:#Alsace;# 43:#
FrancheQComté;# 52:# Pays# de# la# Loire;# 53:# Bretagne;# 54:# PoitouQCharentes;# 72:# Aquitaine;# 73:#MidiQPyrénées;# 74:# Limousin;# 82:# RhônesQ
Alpes;#83:#Auvergne;#91:#LanguedocQRoussillon;#93:#Provence#Q#Alpes#Côtes#d’Azur.#
